I have long argued that the risk of a collapse in global economic growth and inflation was over-stated and more recently that major central banks had likely reached an important inflexion point.
A global recession and global deflation have seemingly been averted and central bank policy rate cuts and extensions of quantitative easing programs have become rarer occurrences.
Donald Trump’s election has turbo-charged expectations that reflationary US-centric policies will drive global, and in particular US growth and inflation in 2017, that the Fed’s hiking cycle will step up a gear and that US yields and equities and the dollar will climb further, heaping pressure on emerging economies and asset prices.
But analysts and markets may now be getting ahead of themselves.
My core reasoning is that US inflation may not rise as fast expected, due to lags in the implementation of Trump’s planned fiscal policy loosening and immigration curbs, residual slack in the US labour market and disinflationary impact of higher US yields and a stronger dollar.
As a result, the FOMC, which will see important personnel changes in early 2017, may argue that the market has already done some its work and not be as hawkish as expected.
In this scenario, US short-end rates could lose ground while long-end rates continue to push higher, resulting in a steepening of a still not very steep US rates curve.
One corollary is that factors which have wakened the euro may lose traction as 2017 progresses.